Why China pulled out of European football

Beijing 2008 showed the world a modern, powerful China. In the 2010s, Xi Jinping made football a national project: China would become a 'football superpower'. Owning famous European clubs was a shortcut to prestige, know-how and global visibility. Chinese conglomerates followed the Party's signal.

Sovereignty over capital. Beijing began treating club purchases abroad as capital flight. One decision in Beijing reshaped ownership from Madrid to Milan.

Borrowed money, borrowed time. Wanda and Suning bought clubs with loans. When Beijing stopped backing them, Wanda sold Atlético and Suning couldn't repay and lost Inter.

Football on the state's terms. Salary caps, sponsors' names removed from club names, and in 2021 Suning shut its own Chinese club, months after winning the title.

When Chinese owners ran out of cash, they turned to American investment funds for loans, putting their clubs up as collateral. In 2018, Li Yonghong couldn't repay Elliott, and AC Milan changed hands. In 2024, Suning failed to repay around €395m to Oaktree, and Inter went the same way.

Atlético followed a slower path: Wanda sold in 2018, then American funds Ares and Apollo moved in, and in March 2026 Apollo became majority owner. Even the stadium tells the story: once the Wanda Metropolitano, it is now the Riyadh Air Metropolitano.

China didn't qualify for the 2026 World Cup, yet it was everywhere. Lenovo, a top-tier FIFA partner, deployed more than 17,000 devices and 350 engineers across the 16 stadiums. Hisense supplied the VAR screens. Mengniu was back for a third tournament in a row.

But the US–China rivalry followed them onto the pitch: there were fewer Chinese sponsors than in 2018 and 2022, partly because of trade and technology tensions with Washington.